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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers emphasize original legislative expectations when they talk about
statutory interpretation. The lawyer's perspective is inspired by concern for the
rule of law and by anxiety over policymaking by unelected officials. These
concerns do not dictate the static assumptions lawyers draw from them,
however.' More importantly, traditional theories of legal interpretation project
a vision of government decisionmaking as essentially discontinuous acts made by
wooden and isolated institutions. Lawyers ought to rethink this vision in light
of other theories regarding the operation of the legislature.
Positive political theory ("PPT")' views statute making as a continuous
process, an institutional process, a necessarily dynamic process. Congress, the
president, and the judiciary each have goals and policy preferences which they
seek to implement. The institutions that seek to impose their preferences within
the constraints of defined roles interact in a dynamic process of statutory
lawmaking. Congress enacts the statute, the president or an independent agency
implements and interprets the statute, courts review the executive implementa-
tion and interpretation, and Congress considers statutory amendments in
response to implementations and interpretations by the other two branches. The
policymaking process is a spiral of institutional competition and cooperation.
Statutory interpretation, considered from the perspective of PPT, yields a
number of iconoclastic conclusions.3 In this new tradition, Professors Schwartz,
Spiller, and Urbiztondo suggest that judges pay attention to legislative history,
not because of rule-of-law or legitimacy concerns, but because of their own
institutional desire not to be overridden by Congress for reading their prefer-
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ences into statutes.' Under this regime, Congress has incentives to send credible
signals to the Supreme Court. Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbitztondo suggest that
Congress sends its clearest signals when it is very concerned about an issue of
statutory interpretation and when the costs of overriding a contrary interpreta-
tion are relatively low (when, for example, there is a consensus on the issue
within Congress). The Court will attend to these sorts of legislative signals when
examining a statute, even if its own preferences would suggest another
interpretation or if the signals come after the statute has been enacted. The
hypothesis of the article needs a more sophisticated model of judicial prefer-
ences, but as modified it would present a robust positive theory of the Burger
Court's extraordinary reliance on post-enactment legislative signals. On the
other hand, the Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo model does not present a
robust positive theory of the Rehnquist Court's decisions.
I
A MODEL OF JUDICIAL PREFERENCES AND THE RELEVANCE OF POST-
ENACTMENT LEGISLATIVE SIGNALS
Lawyers believe that courts are primarily concerned with enforcing and
following the rule of law when they interpret statutes. Positive political theorists
tend to believe that courts are primarily concerned with reading their own
preferences into statutes, to the extent they can do so while avoiding
congressional overrides.' These views are not as inconsistent as they appear.'
On the one hand, positive political theorists cannot exclude rule-of-law
considerations from their models. Assuming, as PPT does, that courts seek to
impose their own preferences on statutes to the extent they can without being
overridden, one still needs a theory of judicial preferences. Although there is
extensive literature on congressional and presidential preferences, there is no
generally accepted theory of judicial preferences. Yet there is good reason to
believe that judicial preferences are not formed in the same way as congressional
or presidential preferences. Because federal (and many state) judges have life
tenure, and hence are not anxious about fundraising for reelection campaigns,
they are not subject to the influence of organized interest groups as are Congress
and the president. Although judges may have policy preferences that influence
their readings of statutes, judicial preference for coherence in the law is more
important in a large majority of cases. A judge will prefer interpretations that
accord with professionally accepted ways (canons) of reading statutory texts,
other provisions of the statute, other statutes, statutory precedents, the common
4. Edward P. Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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law, and constitutional law. Judicial preference for coherence is found not only
in nonbinding judicial pronouncements to that effect, but also in the numerous
cases in which judges have interpreted statutes strongly against their known
preferences and with every expectation that Congress would not override their
result. In these cases, it is clear that the judges felt constrained by coherence
(rule-of-law) concerns.
Consider Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.7  Danny Griffin, a welder
working on Oceanic's vessels in the North Sea, was injured during his employ-
ment and subsequently discharged. Oceanic withheld $412.50 in earned wages
that Griffin claimed were owed to him, and he brought suit under a federal
statute that required certain maritime employers to pay wages within a specified
period following termination of a seaman's employment. The statute further
provided: "Every master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payment in
the manner hereinbefore mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the
seaman a sum equal to two days' pay for each and every day during which
payment is delayed beyond the respective periods."8  The trial court found
Oceanic liable for the withheld wages and assessed the penalty for the period
between discharge (April 1, 1976) and Griffin's reemployment (May 5, 1976); the
penalty amounted to $6,881.60.' The Supreme Court directed that the penalty
had to be recalculated to reflect the period between the seaman's discharge and
the actual date of payment (which was not until after the trial court's judgment).
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court relied on the literal terms of the
statute, which said that the owner "shall pay" penalty wages "for each and every
day during which payment is withheld." No exceptions appeared on the face of
the statute. Hence, by the Court's calculations, the penalty for withholding
$412.50 became $302,790.40. lo
This interpretation provided a lavish windfall to the seaman and sets up odd
incentives for seamen and shipowners in this situation. It is doubtful that Justice
Rehnquist and at least some of the other Justices in the majority were
sympathetic to such windfall recoveries. Although Justice Rehnquist included
boilerplate language about Congress's ability to amend the statute to correct this
obvious inefficiency, Congress rarely overrides the Court in matters of labor-
management relations, because such issues are highly conflictual. Thus, there has
been no discernible effort to override Griffin." Yet Justice Rehnquist was
7. 458 U.S. 564 (1982).
8. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (repealed 1983).
9. Griffin, 458 U.S. at 564.
10. Id. at 579.
11. In 1983, Congress rewrote the double wages provision, as part of a general recodification. See
Shipping Enactment, Pub. L. No. 98-89, 97 Stat. 566 (1983) (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g) (1988)).
The House committee report suggested that
the literal language of the statute should control the disposition of the cases. There is no
mandate in logic or in case law for reliance on legislative history to reach a result contrary to
the plain meaning of the statute, particularly where that plain meaning is in no way
unreasonable.
H.R. REP. No. 338, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 120 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 932.
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probably quite comfortable interpreting the statute in this way, because he has
internalized the judicial norm that clear texts should be interpreted according to
their plain meaning unless such interpretation would render the statute
unconstitutional or absurd. As this example illustrates, political theorists need
to consider coherence (rule-of-law) concerns in constructing their theory of
judicial preferences.
On the other hand, rule-of-law values do not exhaust the preferences that are
relevant to statutory interpretation. Traditional sources of legal interpretation
often support more than one interpretation of a statute, giving interpreters
lawmaking discretion. 2 When exercising that discretion, judges typically
consider how a "reasonable" lawmaker might have intended the statute to be
interpreted. 3 The judges will consider a variety of factors, including his or her
own preferences (what would I do?) and the preferences of the current
legislature (how would the legislature answer the question today?). To figure out
the preferences of the current legislature, the Court might consider legislative
history. As Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo suggest, statements in committee
reports and by key players in the legislature can signal both intensity and
consensus in Congress on a certain issue. A Court interested in either rule-of-
law values or reading its own policy preferences into statutes would attend
carefully to such statements.
When the legislative history is clear and the statutory text is equally clear,
then the job of interpretation is an easy one. The more interesting cases are
those where neither the statutory text nor the original legislative history
anticipates the interpretive issue before the Court. These challenging cases recur
and tend to multiply as societal and legal circumstances change over time.14
Although the original legislative history remains relevant in such cases,15
Schwartz, Spiller, and Urbiztondo suggest that courts will be interested in signals
sent by later Congresses, including statements by relevant committees and key
legislators setting forth their understanding of how the statute should be
construed. The authors suggest that such subsequent legislative history will be
most persuasive to the Court when the history reflects intense legislative interest
12. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
13. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1200, 1414-15 (tent. ed. 1958).
14. They recur and multiply for a number of reasons: (1) Society responds to the statute in ways
that Congress cannot predict; over time the problems targeted by Congress are solved or go away, and
new versions of the problem arise. (2) Some or all of the assumptions originally made by Congress turn
out to be not completely true; false assumptions create fact situations and equitable conflicts Congress
would not have considered. (3) New legal developments, including new statutes and constitutional
decisions, often influence the reasonableness of certain statutory interpretations and press the earlier
statute in directions the enacting Congress would not have expected. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1990).
15. For example, the congressional purpose suggested by the legislative history is a means by which
interpreters can adapt the statute to circumstances not precisely anticipated by the enacting legislature.
See HART & SACKS, supra note 13, at 1203-15; Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947).
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in the issue and little potential opposition to a statutory override of contrary
judicial interpretations.
II
THE BURGER COURT'S RELIANCE ON POST-ENACTMENT
LEGISLATIVE SIGNALS
The hypothesis that the Supreme Court will be interested in post-enactment
legislative signals of intense interest and low override costs is borne out by the
Burger Court's statutory decisions. The Burger Court was often willing to
consider post-enactment legislative signals, usually read the signals astutely, and
was rarely overridden when subsequent Congresses sent cogent signals of their
interest in an issue. The Court's willingness to consider post-enactment signals
provides a useful way to conceptualize the Burger Court's approach to these
doctrines of statutory interpretation.
A. Subsequent Legislative History
Subsequent legislative history has little or no formal relevance to original
legislative intent or statutory plain meaning and is accordingly viewed with
suspicion under traditional doctrines of statutory interpretation. 6 Although the
Burger Court accepted the traditional view that "'the views of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one, '' 17
the Court also believed that "such views are entitled to significant weight and
particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.' 8
Consistent with a theory of post-enactment legislative signals, the Burger Court
was much more likely to treat subsequent legislative history as probative when
that history reflected intense interest and consensus on that issue in recent
Congresses.
For example, in United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield,
Alabama, 9 the Court interpreted section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 196520
to apply to municipalities on the ground that they were "political subdivisions"
of states, explicitly covered in section 4. The dissent made a strong case that the
Court's reading was not the plain meaning of the statute, was inconsistent with
the statutory structure, and was contrary to specific legislative expectations in
1965 that "political subdivisions" would be narrowly construed.2' Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court did not refute these rule-of-law arguments, but
16. See Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1125 (1983).
17. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) (quoting
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
18. Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (citing NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974)).
19. 435 U.S. 110, 118 (1978).
20. 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988 & Supp. V)).
21. 435 U.S. at 140-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
relied instead upon signals that Congress in the 1970s supported a broad reading
of section 4.' That evidence suggested specific and relatively intense congres-
sional interest in the issue. By 1975, even critics of the Act believed it applied
to municipalities, suggesting to at least some Justices the likelihood of an
override if the Court interpreted the statute narrowly.
3
Sheffield can be contrasted to the "snail darter case," TVA v. Hill.24 In
TVA, the Court interpreted the Endangered Species Act' to halt the construc-
tion of a multimillion dollar dam. The Court based its decision upon the broad
statutory language and specific legislative history of the recently enacted statute
which indicated that Congress strongly desired the protection of endangered
species to be accomplished without regard to cost. 6 The Court rejected TVA's
argument that continued appropriations for the dam and specific exempting
language in reports by appropriations committees in both the House and Senate
indicated a legislative intent to allow construction of almost-completed dams to
go forward.27 This case can be seen as one in which Congress sent mixed
signals: Before the statute was enacted, the sponsors of the statute and the
substantive committee reports signaled a strong commitment to broad enforce-
ment of the statute-whereas after it was enacted, the appropriations com-
mittee's reports signaled a willingness to permit exceptions to the statute's
prohibitions. The Court's decision in TVA suggests that in a case of mixed
signals, particularly where the later signals are not from substantive committees,
rule-of-law considerations will be determinative in the Court's interpretation of
a statute.
B. Legislative Inaction as a Ratification of Statutory Precedents
The theory of post-enactment legislative signals also provides a way to
explain the Burger Court's approach to statutory precedents. Once a court or
an agency had authoritatively interpreted a statute, the Burger Court was often
willing to treat those past interpretations as binding on the current Court, even
when they were in strong tension with other rule-of-law values. The Court
usually explained its deference by relying on Congress's inaction: Because
Congress had not overridden the precedents, they should be treated as having
22. Justice Brennan cited specific evidence in the hearings, as well as in both House and Senate
committee reports, that by 1975 the key legislative players assumed that section 4 included municipalities.
Id. at 133-34 (opinion for the Court). Although this was "original" legislative history for the 1975
reenactment of the Voting Rights Act, it was "subsequent" legislative history for the 1965 and 1970
versions under which the case was brought.
23. Justices Brennan and Marshall probably favored liberal readings of the Voting Rights Act as
a matter of their own ideology. But moderate Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell (or some
of the four) would probably have followed the rule-of-law arguments of Justice Stevens' dissent (joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist) if Congress's post-enactment signals had not been so
strong.
24. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
25. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (1988)).
26. Hill, 437 U.S. at 173-93.
27. Brief for Hill at 7-18, Hill (No. 76-1701).
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been ratified after the fact. Academics have been scornful of the Court's
practice on the ground that it rests upon an unrealistic view of the legislative
process,28 but the theory of post-enactment legislative signals suggests a way to
understand the Court's practice.
Perhaps the most criticized case invoking stare decisis for statutory precedents
and the legislative inaction doctrine is Flood v. Kuhn.29 A badly divided Court
refused to overrule its fifty-year-old decision' exempting major league baseball
from the Sherman Act. Although rule-of-law values forcefully supported
overruling the precedent, the Court was reluctant to do so "when Congress, by
its positive inaction, ha[d] allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far
beyond mere inference and implication, ha[d] clearly evinced a desire not to
disapprove them legislatively."'" The Court was in fact relying, not on mere
inaction, but on post-enactment legislative signals that baseball should be exempt
from antitrust laws. Dozens of bills dealing with sports and antitrust were
introduced in Congress between 1957 and 1965.32 Almost all of the bills would
have expanded baseball's exemption to other professional sports, as did the two
bills that passed one chamber or the other (the House in 1958, the Senate in
1965)."3 The failure of these bills to become laws was a signal not just that
Congress was aware of baseball's unique position, but also that there may have
been a consensus in favor of exemption. Although these signals were not as
powerful as those in, for example, Sheffield, they were strong enough to save the
exemption, given the feelings of some members of the Court that baseball should
receive special treatment. 34
Stronger post-enactment signals explain another controversial Burger Court
decision, Bob Jones University v. United States.35  In 1970-71, the Internal
Revenue Service reinterpreted the tax code's exemption for "educational"
institutions as inapplicable to schools (like Bob Jones) that discriminated on the
basis of race. 6  Although this administrative interpretation was arguably
inconsistent with the statute's plain meaning, a virtually unanimous 37 Court
followed the agency's interpretation.38 Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the
Court emphasized post-enactment legislative signals, specifically deliberation in
28. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 422 (1988); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); Earl Maltz, The Nature of
Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367 (1988).
29. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
30. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
31. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-84.
32. Brief for Respondents at 32-36, Flood (No. 71-32).
33. Id.
34. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
223-26 (1979).
35. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
36. Id. at 578-79.
37. Id. at 612-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, argued for an
interpretation consistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
38. Id. at 605 (opinion of the Court).
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congressional committee hearings about the agency's interpretation, rejection of
specific amendments to override the agency, and a statutory expansion of the
agency's view to deny tax exemptions to social clubs that discriminate.39
Although there had been no congressional action codifying the agency's
interpretation, Congress's subsequent actions signaled to the Court's conserva-
tives and moderates that Congress cared about the issue and would likely
override a contrary interpretation.4 These signals may have been decisive for
some Justices-especially after the Reagan Administration directed the IRS to
reverse the very policy to which the Court in Bob Jones was deferring.41
C. Deference to Agencies And Post-Enactment Legislative Signaling
In Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,42 the Burger
Court announced that it would give wide berth to dynamic statutory interpreta-
tion by agencies. The Court's reasoning was that, where there is no clear rule
of law to apply in a case, and hence where policymaking is inevitable, it is more
legitimate in a representative democracy for an agency to make the policy
choices than it is for a court to do so. Positive political theorists consider
Chevron a puzzle: Why would the Court give up opportunities to read its
preferences into statutes and, instead, accept the preferences of another player
in the policy game?
43
One (and probably not the only) political justification for Chevron is
suggested by the theory of post-enactment legislative signals. It is easier for
Congress to send such signals to agencies (through oversight hearings,
appropriations measures, and informal contacts) than to courts. By giving
agencies latitude to update statutes, Chevron may have been a judicial signal to
Congress that it can send at least some of its post-enactment signals through the
administrative process. In tax law, for instance, interest groups, the IRS, and
committee staffs often negotiate agency regulations during and after the
enactment process."
Thus, the Burger Court was sometimes willing to defer to agency interpreta-
tions the Court did not favor, when there was strong indication that the agency
interpretation reflected post-enactment legislative signals. 5 In School Board v.
39. Id. at 599-602; see also id. at 607 (Powell, J., concurring). The main argument of the Court's
opinion was that the agency's interpretation was consistent with the statute's purpose.
40. Specifically, Chief Justice Burger (the author of the opinion) and Justices Stewart, White,
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall probably believed in the substantive
values strongly enough to support the agency notwithstanding the legislative signals.
41. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 574.
42. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
43. See Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, The Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65
(Spring 1994).
44. See Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819 (1991).
45. See, e.g., Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 148-52 (1987); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 530-35 (1982); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686-87 & n.7 (1979).
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Arline,' for example, the Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act of 197347
to prohibit discrimination against a person afflicted with contagious tuberculosis.
Neither the vague statutory language, generalized legislative history, nor
precedent compelled the conservative Court to interpret the statute so
liberally'l Instead, the Court deferred to agency regulations, which "were
drafted with the oversight and approval of Congress .... ."'9 The history of the
agency's interpretation suggested that Congress was interested in the issue, and
that an override would have been likely if the Court had construed the statute
more conservatively.50
III
THE REHNQUIST COURT'S NEGLECT OF POST-ENACTMENT SIGNALS IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Rehnquist Court's attitude toward post-enactment legislative signals has
been markedly different from that of the Burger Court, especially in civil rights
cases. In contrast to the Burger Court, the Rehnquist Court tends to treat post-
enactment legislative signals with open hostility, viewing subsequent legislative
history with contempt, for example. 1 Thus, in Public Employees Retirement
System of Ohio v. Betts, 2 the Court interpreted section 4(f)(2) of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967"3 to exempt a state public
employees' retirement plan from the Act. The Court reasoned that the plan was
not clearly a "subterfuge," the term used in the exemption. The Court
interpreted the statutory exemption broadly, notwithstanding specifically contrary
language on the issue in the conference committee report for a 1978 amendment
to the Act. "We have observed on more than one occasion that the interpreta-
tion given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an earlier
statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute," 4 the
Court archly rejoined. Betts is a striking example of the Rehnquist Court's
position; the subsequent legislative history (a conference report) was a much
stronger signal for a restrictive interpretation of the Act than subsequent history,
46. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
48. As argued by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289-93.
49. Id. at 279 (opinion of the Court).
50. Indeed, Congress codified the result in Arline when it enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (1988)).
51. See Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2491-92 n.9 (1992); Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct.
1919, 1927 n.4 (1991); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1990); Sullivan
v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628-29 n.8 (1990); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 609-10 (1989);
United States v. Taylor, 478 U.S. 326 (1988); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825,
838-40 (1988) (extensive discussion); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,63-
64 n.4 (1987).
52. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
53. 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
54. Betts, 492 U.S. at 168.
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usually just consisting of committee reports and member statements, which the
Burger Court was willing to credit in cases like Sheffield.55 Not surprisingly,
Congress overrode Betts almost immediately.56
Similarly, the Rehnquist Court has been notably unwilling to bootstrap what
it believes to be erroneous judicial or agency interpretations based on legislative
signals of approval or acquiescence. The leading decision is Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union.57 Brenda Patterson, an African-American woman, sued her
employer for harassing and firing her, allegedly for racially discriminatory
reasons. Her cause of action rested on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which assures everyone
"the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white
citizens.""8 An issue in Patterson, raised by the Court sua sponte, was whether
to overrule Runyon v. McCrary,59 a decision that interpreted section 1981 as
prohibiting private as well as public discrimination in contractual relations. In
Patterson, the Court unanimously affirmed Runyon, at least in principle, but
splintered as to a rationale. Writing for four concurring Justices, Justice Brennan
argued that in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress had sent numerous signals
supportive of Runyon,' but the Court majority rejected the relevance of these
recent legislative signals.6 The Justices' different attitudes toward recent
legislative signals reflected different attitudes toward Runyon itself, which the
Court majority interpreted narrowly and the concurring Justices broadly. Brenda
Patterson lost her case, but within two years Congress overrode the decision.62
Both Patterson and Betts were cases in which the Court rejected longstanding
agency interpretations of the statutes they were charged with enforcing, even
though the agency views clearly reflected the current congressional preferences.
Since 1988, the Rehnquist Court has applied Chevron more restrictively than the
Burger Court did, refusing to defer to agency interpretations in conflict with
statutory plain meaning.63 Again, this new attitude on the part of the Court
reflects its disregard for post-enactment legislative signals.
55. Ironically, Betts may be a mild example of the Rehnquist Court's approach, because the Court
did discuss the subsequent legislative history. There has been a tendency in later opinions for the Court
simply to give those arguments even shorter shrift than Betts did. Sullivan, 496 U.S. at 628-29 n.8; cf.
id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (refusing to join footnote 8, because subsequent legislative
history is no longer worth discussing).
56. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (overriding
Betts "to restore the original congressional intent in passing and amending the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act... which was to prohibit discrimination against older workers in all employee benefits
57. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
59. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
60. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 200-305 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
61. Id. at 175 n.1 (opinion of the Court).
62. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
63. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 43, at [34]; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive
Precedent, 101 YALE LJ. 969 (1992).
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The Rehnquist Court's refusal to attend to post-enactment legislative signals
reflects the Court's normative objections to the assumptions of PPT.' On the
one hand, the Court is signaling its strong preference for rule-of-law values over
political expediency and its view that textual coherence is the paramount rule-of-
law value. The Court's effort to distance its "rule-of-law" decisionmaking from
"political" decisionmaking may rest upon a belief that the Court's legitimacy
depends upon the public's confidence that the Court is more than just another
political organ of government.
On the other hand, the Court may be trying to discourage Congress from
sending post-enactment signals. By trying to influence statutory interpretation
through these informal channels, Congress is arguably shirking its responsibility
under article I, section 7 of the Constitution to make statutory policy only when
both chambers concur and the matter is presented to the president for possible
veto.65 Neither the Court nor agencies can update policy by bending clear
statutory language, which reflects the wise insights of both rule-of-law and
democratic theory; the Constitution requires Congress to amend the statute in
such circumstances. That Congress has overridden so many of the Court's recent
civil rights decisions is evidence that Congress can fulfill its constitutional role if
so required. The most the Court can do is establish well-defined baselines from
which Congress can write clear statutes that satisfy the "rule of law" and the
"law of rules" in a democracy.66
The Rehnquist Court's rebuff to PPT's suggestion that the Court is just
another player in the political game of creating statutory policy reflects a
normatively attractive political philosophy, but it can be questioned from several
different directions. Legal theorists might ask whether the Court's practice really
delivers on the promise of its rhetoric. Do the Court's decisions merely apply
a neutral rule of law? My examination of the Court's civil rights decisions
between 1988 and 1992 provisionally suggests that the Rehnquist Court's civil
rights decisions are not supported by any neutral rule-of-law criteria, least of all
any rigorous textualism.67 Instead, I read the Court's decisions as reflecting a
specific ideological vision of civil rights law, influenced far more by political
feelings than by sharp textual analysis. This observation presents a standing
challenge to the Court to consider whether its hard-edged approach to statutory
interpretation is any more legitimate than the approach of the Burger Court,
whose political conservatism was softened by its pragmatic approach to statutory
interpretation.
64. The critique suggested in this section has been articulated mainly by Justice Scalia; in its
strongest form it is probably not accepted by a majority of the Court. See generally Eskridge, supra note
5, at 404-14.
65. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); see also
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). For analysis
and critique, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
523 (1992).
66. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
67. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 675-80.
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CONCLUSION: THE NEW COURT VERSUS THE NEW THEORY
One the one hand, positive political theorists might ask whether the
Rehnquist Court is serving the country's interests well by ignoring post-
enactment legislative signals. What are the institutional advantages of the
Burger Court's more responsive approach? Does the Rehnquist Court's
approach place too much of a burden on the legislative agenda? Are post-
enactment legislative signals a relatively efficient way for our system of
government to update statutes?
On the other hand, rule-of-law adherents of the Rehnquist Court might ask
whether positive political theorists are endorsing positive practices (like
subsequent legislative history) that are normatively indefensible. Is a Court ever
sacrificing its integrity as the main rule-of-law institution when it gives
interpretive weight to post-enactment signals? Is such signal-giving consistent
with Congress's role under article I, section 7? Is a regime of giving and
crediting post-enactment legislative signals consistent with democratic ideals?
